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ABSTRACT
As is common across the public sector, the UK police service is under
pressure to do more with less, to target resources more efficiently
and take steps to identify threats proactively; for example under risk-
assessment schemes such as ‘Clare’s Law’ and ‘Sarah’s Law’.
Algorithmic tools promise to improve a police force’s decision-
making and prediction abilities by making better use of data
(including intelligence), both from inside and outside the force. This
article uses Durham Constabulary’s Harm Assessment Risk Tool
(HART) as a case-study. HART is one of the first algorithmic models
to be deployed by a UK police force in an operational capacity. Our
article comments upon the potential benefits of such tools, explains
the concept and method of HART and considers the results of the
first validation of the model’s use and accuracy. The article then
critiques the use of algorithmic tools within policing from a societal
and legal perspective, focusing in particular upon substantive
common law grounds for judicial review. It considers a concept of
‘experimental’ proportionality to permit the use of unproven
algorithms in the public sector in a controlled and time-limited way,
and as part of a combination of approaches to combat algorithmic
opacity, proposes ‘ALGO-CARE’, a guidance framework of some of
the key legal and practical concerns that should be considered in
relation to the use of algorithmic risk assessment tools by the police.
The article concludes that for the use of algorithmic tools in a
policing context to result in a ‘better’ outcome, that is to say, a
more efficient use of police resources in a landscape of more
consistent, evidence-based decision-making, then an ‘experimental’
proportionality approach should be developed to ensure that new
solutions from ‘big data’ can be found for criminal justice problems
traditionally arising from clouded, non-augmented decision-making.
Finally, this article notes that there is a sub-set of decisions around
which there is too great an impact upon society and upon the
welfare of individuals for them to be influenced by an emerging
technology; to an extent, in fact, that they should be removed from
the influence of algorithmic decision-making altogether.
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Introduction
In this article, we are concerned with the operation and deployment of algorithms within
policing. We define an algorithm as a mathematical formula implemented by technology:
‘a sequence of instructions that are carried out to transform the input to the output.’1 We
focus on algorithms employing machine learning, whereby the computer learns and
creates the algorithm for the task from the given input data; as Gal puts it, ‘the algorithm
self-adjusts based on its own analyses of data previously encountered, freeing the algor-
ithm from predefined preferences.’2 (We do not comment on coded rules, programmed
logic or database interrogation or linking.)
In the United States, algorithmic tools are now used in a number of States across the crim-
inal justice system to inform human decision-making with respect to decisions or judge-
ments about individuals. One such tool was introduced in Chicago to predict those
individuals who are likely to be involved in gun violence,3 and software developed by a
company called Northpointe is being used to assess recidivism risk and thus inform parole
and sentencing decisions.4 Algorithmic risk assessment tools were initially used only by pro-
bation and parole departments but have now expanded to bail hearings and sentencing.5
Compared with the United States, in the UK policing context, the use of algorithmic
decision-making tools could be described as being in a developmental stage with
implementation on a force by force basis. A recent freedom of information-based study
concluded that a relatively small number of UK police forces (14%) were using compu-
tational or algorithmic data analysis or decision-making in relation to the analysis of intel-
ligence, with tools stated to be used for all three of the purposes mentioned below.6 One
UK force has made substantive use of a predictive policing tool developed by the private
sector (‘PredPol’, implemented by Kent Constabulary) in order to predict areas where
offences are likely to take place.7 It has been reported that West Midlands police are
testing a third party system called ‘Valcri’ for use in the investigative process,8 a tool
that aims to group similar crimes by the analysis of semantic features.9
It has been suggested that there are currently three main purposes for algorithmic data
or intelligence analysis within the policing context: (i) predictive policing on a macro level
incorporating strategic planning, prioritisation and forecasting; (ii) operational intelligence
1Ethem Alpaydin, ‘Machine Learning’ (MIT Press, 2016), 16.
2Michal S. Gal ‘Algorithmic Challenges to Autonomous Choice’ (May 20, 2017), 6. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2971456 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2971456.
3Jeff Asher and Rob Arthur ‘Inside the algorithm that tries to predict gun violence in Chicago’ New York Times, June
13, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-an-algorithm-reveals-about-life-on-chicagos-high-risk-list.
html.
4Adam Liptak ‘Sent to prison by a software program’s secret algorithms’ New York Times, May 1, 2017 https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-algorithms.html.
5Geoffrey Barnes and Jordan M. Hyatt ‘Classifying Adult Probationers by Forecasting Future Offending’ Final Technical
Report, March 2012 https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238082.pdf.
6Marion Oswald and Jamie Grace ‘Intelligence, policing and the use of algorithmic analysis: a freedom of information-based
study’ (2016) Vol 1, No. 1, Journal of Information Rights, Policy & Practice https://journals.winchesteruniversitypress.org/
index.php/jirpp/article/view/16.
7Rachel O’Donoghue ‘Is Kent’s predictive policing project the future of crime prevention?’ Kent Online, 5 April 2016 http://
www.kentonline.co.uk/sheerness/news/what-if-police-could-detect-93715/.
8Oliver Moody ‘Detectives call in AI to hunt offenders’ The Times, May 17, 2017 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/
detectives-call-in-ai-to-hunt-offenders-8g5ncqxsr.
9Dominik Sacha et al. ‘Applying Visual Interactive Dimensionality Reduction to Criminal Intelligence Analysis’ VALCRI White
Paper Series, 1 February 2017 http://valcri.org/our-content/uploads/2017/02/VALCRI-WP-2017-011-Interactive-Visual-
Dimension-Reduction.pdf.
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linking and evaluation which may include, for instance, crime reduction activities;10 and
(iii) decision-making or risk-assessments relating to individuals.11 This article considers
the hypothesis that the use of algorithmic tools in a policing context could result in a
‘better’ outcome from the following perspectives: public safety, legal, and cost/resources.
It does this by focusing upon an algorithmic risk-assessment tool in category (iii) (decision-
making or risk-assessments relating to individuals) known as the ‘Harm Assessment Risk
Tool’ (or ‘HART’).
The tool was developed by statistical experts based at the University of Cambridge12 in
collaboration with Durham Constabulary. It has been developed to aid decision-making by
custody officers when assessing the risk of future offending and to enable those arrestees
forecast as moderate risk to be eligible for the Constabulary’s Checkpoint programme.
Checkpoint is an intervention currently being tested in the Constabulary and is an ‘out
of court disposal’ (a way of dealing with an offence not requiring prosecution in court)
aimed at reducing future offending.13 It is understood that other UK forces are considering
the development of similar predictive tools, although this may be in connection with
different programmes or contexts, with potential for such tools to be implemented to
prioritise investigative actions or where the police have to decide whether to supply
public protection risk information, based on an actuarial judgement (such as ‘Clare’s
Law’14). For schemes where difficult risk-based judgements are required, it has been
argued that a fair and trustworthy algorithmic decision-making tool may potentially be
helpful, provided not used in a determinative way.15
The HART implementation represents an ideal case-study because it is one of the first
operational deployments of algorithmic methods within UK policing, and is subject to
ongoing assessment and validation as set out below. We agree with Beer that to
analyse an algorithm detached from the social world is likely to be a mistake.16 Algorithms
in policing have ‘outcomes in mind’ and are likely to result in ‘recursive processes as those
outcomes are modelled back into algorithm design.’17 The HART deployment is linked to a
demonstrable policing objective. In order therefore to consider the impact of HART, we
must not only consider the code (as much as we can being non-experts), but also the
way that it might ‘mesh’ into a police force, its routines, objectives and decision-making
processes.18 Such technologies are not, of themselves, silver bullets for law enforcement
operational and resourcing concerns; neither are they sinister machinations of a so-
called ‘surveillance state’. One of the challenges for the future will be to demonstrate
10Such as that introduced in Chicago to tackle gun crime by way of surveillance cameras, microphones and predictive soft-
ware: Joel Gunter ‘Chicago goes high-tech in search of answers to gun crime surge’ BBC News, 19 June 2017 http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40293666.
11Oswald and Grace, n6.
12Geoffrey Barnes ‘Focusing Police Resources: Algorithmic Forecasting in Durham’, paper presented to the 9th International
Conference on Evidence-Based Policing, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 16th July 2016.
13Checkpoint programme webpage, Durham Constabulary https://www.durham.police.uk/Information-and-advice/Pages/
Checkpoint.aspx.
14See Jamie Grace ‘Clare’s Law, or the national Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme: The contested legalities of criminality
information sharing’ Journal of Criminal Law (2015) 79(1) 36–45.
15Marion Oswald and Jamie Grace, (2016) ‘Norman Stanley Fletcher and the case of the proprietary algorithmic risk assess-
ment’ Policing Insight, available at http://repository.winchester.ac.uk/305/.
16David Beer ‘The social power of algorithms’ (2017) Information, Communication & Society 20(1) 1–13 http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1216147?src=recsys.
17Beer, n16.
18Beer, n16.
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that algorithmic technologies achieve a better outcome than other methods for important
public purposes, but to do this, we will have to decide what ‘better’ means. How will we
measure success, a particularly thorny problem when the ideal ‘double-blind’ trial would
not be acceptable, for instance deliberately letting an individual assessed as high risk
go free to test the operation of an algorithm.19
The necessity, proportionality and foreseeability principles set out in European human
rights law provide us with a starting point, recognising as they do the need to strike a fair
balance between individual rights and the needs of a community. We consider proportion-
ality in particular in this article which, as Rivers summarises, means that the government
‘must satisfy the court by providing sufficient and cogent reasons, established on the
balance of probability, that the limitation fulfils a legitimate aim, is means-end rational,
adopts the least restrictive means and is balanced overall.’20 A ‘better’ outcome could
be said to be one that infringes less on individual rights, so adopting the least intrusive
means compared with other possible methods. In order to assess this however, we
need to consider the algorithm not as stand-alone technology, but as part of a particular
context, and consider how the algorithm has improved, changed or shaped processes,
practices and outcomes, or might do so.
Algorithmic technologies are, however, inmanywaysexperimental, certainly so in thepoli-
cing context21; there is little consensus around benefits and risks, or about their likely long
term effects on individuals and society.22 It may even be difficult to give a ‘simple binary
answer’ to the question of whether the state’s aim is capable of being achieved by the
‘rights-limiting [algorithmic] action.’23 In addition, machines ‘think’ differently to humans;
‘When a computer learns and consequently builds its own representation of a classification
decision, it does so without regard for human comprehension.’24 We are facing a different
type of decision-making, not an enhanced human brain. Will therefore judicial review and
human rights principles stand the test of time? How much opacity are we prepared to
accept? How much error? How much uncertainty in terms of future benefits? We consider
thesequestions against current case-lawandpropose a concept of ‘experimental’proportion-
ality under which uncertainty is recognised (and to some extent accepted) in relation to the
deployment of algorithmic technologies in the public sector, provided that the proportional-
ity of such technologies is kept under formal review and the ‘experiment’ time-limited.
The structure of this article is as follows. We outline the concept, method and context of
the Durham HART model, and summarise the results of the first validation study of the
model’s results conducted in 2016. We move on to review some of the major issues
faced by society from the rise of algorithms using HART as a case-study, first from a societal
19But see Jordan M. Hyatt and Geoffrey C. Barnes ‘An Experimental Evaluation of the Impact of Intensive Supervision of High
Risk Probationers’ (2016) Crime and Delinquency 63 (1), 3–38 for an approach which deliberately presented high risk
probationers as lower risk to test the effects of different supervision techniques.
20Julian Rivers ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77(3) MLR 409–433, 414.
21For a discussion of the application of machine learning in a domestic violence context, see Richard A. Berk, Susan
B. Sorenson and Geoffrey Barnes ‘Forecasting Domestic Violence: A Machine Learning Approach to Help Inform Arraign-
ment Decisions’ (2016) Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 13(1), 94–115.
22For an overview of potential harms and issues of concern, see Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale ‘Slave to the Algorithm?
Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You are Looking for’ (forthcoming), Duke Law and Technol-
ogy Review, 9–25. Available at SSRN: http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2972855.
23Rivers n20, 422.
24Jenna Burrell ‘How the machine ‘thinks’: Understanding opacity in machine learning algorithms’ Big Data & Society,
January – June 2016, 1–12, 10.
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perspective and then from a legal perspective focusing upon judicial review and human
rights principles. Then we argue for two linked proposals – a concept of ‘experimental’ pro-
portionality and a decision-making guidance framework called ‘ALGO-CARE’ – which we
believe could create a model that recognises the need for controlled algorithmic exper-
imentation in the public sector while at the same time acknowledging and carefully mana-
ging any risks to individual rights. Our conclusion includes a recommendation for clarity as
to categories of decision that may need to be excluded from the purview of algorithmic
decision-making altogether.
The Durham HART model: concept and method
The Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART) was developed as part of an ongoing collaboration
between Durham Constabulary and the University of Cambridge. The central goal of the
development team was to promote consistency in decision making, enabling targeted
interventions and rigorous testing to find responses to offending that reduce future
harm and recidivism.25
HART was created as part of a programme known as Checkpoint, which is a culture-
changing initiative within Durham Constabulary. Checkpoint seeks to tackle the root
causes of offending and associated health and community issues by offering an alternative
to prosecution for a very specific sub-set of criminal offenders. The programme identifies
why an individual adult has offended, along with the best interventions and services to
support the individual in turning away (i.e. desisting) from crime.26 In order to divert
these offenders away from prosecution, Checkpoint must first identify those who
present an appropriate risk of reoffending. Moreover, this risk must be identified in the
police custody environment, shortly after the offenders have been arrested by the
police and have reached the initial gateway to the criminal justice system.
The current HART model separates offenders into three different predicted risk groups,
only one of which is eligible for the Checkpoint treatment. First, offenders who are pre-
dicted as likely to commit a new serious offence over the next two years are placed in
the High Risk group. In Durham, serious offences are defined as murder, attempted
murder, aggravated violent offences such as grievous bodily harm, robbery, sexual
crimes, and firearm offences. Secondly, those whose forecasted offending over this
same time frame will be limited to non-serious crimes are designated as Moderate Risk.
Finally, those who are predicted to commit no new offences during the next two years
are identified as Low Risk. Only those forecasted as Moderate Risk – who are expected
to offend, but not in a seriously violent manner – are permitted into Checkpoint.
The algorithm deployed in Durham was constructed using random forests, which is one
of many different forms of machine learning. This technique offers desirable features such
as an ability to detect relatively rare but dangerous outcomes, to model relationships in
non-linear ways, and to balance the differential costs of different kinds of errors.27
25Barnes and Hyatt, n5. See also Berk et al., 2009; Berk, 2012; Neyroud, 2015; Sherman, 2012.
26The Lammy Review into the treatment of, and outcomes for, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Individuals in the Criminal
Justice system (8 September 2017) praised these types of deferred prosecution schemes such as Turning Point in the
West Midlands and Checkpoint in Durham where certain offenders had prosecution deferred provided they agreed to
go through a programme of structured interventions.
27Barnes and Hyatt, n5.
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All algorithmic responses use the past, where the outcomes have already taken
place, as a model of what will take place in the future. The HART model is built using
approximately 104,000 custody events over a five year period (2008-2012). It uses 34 differ-
ent predictors to arrive at a forecast, most of which focus upon the prior offender’s history
of criminal behaviour. The random forest is constructed from 509 separate classification
and regression decision trees (CART), which are then combined into the full forecasting
model. Essentially, each tree is a model in and of itself, and produces a forecast which
is then used as one vote out of 509 total votes. The votes are counted, and the overall fore-
cast for the full model becomes the outcome which receives the most votes.28
As with any forecasting effort, HART inevitably produces errors. In this case, however,
the random forests technique treats different types of errors as being differentially
‘costly’. The errors with the highest costs are avoided, and therefore occur less frequently
than those that are less costly. These costs are set deliberately prior to the model’s con-
struction, and in Durham were arrived at after a series of test models were presented to
senior members of the Constabulary. The HART model intentionally favours (i.e. applies
a lower cost to) cautious errors, where the offenders’ levels of risk are over-estimated.
Under-estimates of the offenders’ actual risk levels, referred to as dangerous errors, are
assigned a higher cost and therefore occur less frequently. While both of these examples
are errors in forecasting, the consequences and community impact are very different. The
ratio of these two costs was set so that the model produces roughly two cautious errors for
each dangerous error.
Predictor variables
Of the 34 predictors values used in HART, the majority (29) stem directly from the suspect’s
offending history. These behavioural predictors are combined with age, gender, two forms
of residential postcode, and the count of existing police intelligence reports relating to the
offender. Some of the predictors used in the model, therefore, relate to characteristics that
offenders are unable to change, while others (such as postcode) could be viewed as
indirectly related to measures of community deprivation.
The primary postcode predictor is limited to the first four characters of the postcode,
and usually encompasses a rather large geographic area. Yet even with this limitation,
one could argue that this variable risks a kind of feedback loop that may perpetuate or
amplify existing patterns of offending. If the police respond to forecasts by targeting
their efforts on the highest-risk postcode areas, then more people from these areas will
come to police attention and be arrested than those living in lower-risk, untargeted neigh-
bourhoods. These arrests then become outcomes that are used to generate later iterations
of the same model, leading to an ever-deepening cycle of increased police attention.
It is these predictors that are used to build the model – as opposed to the model itself –
that are of central concern. There is, however, a level of reassurance in the fact that
advanced algorithms such as random forests are based upon millions of nested and con-
ditionally-dependant decision points, spread across many hundreds of unique trees.
Unlike earlier methods of forecasting, it is not the case that a given input on a single pre-
dictor has an inflexible and inescapable impact on the forecasted outcome. Simply
28Berk et al., n21.
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residing in a given postcode, for example, has no direct impact on the forecasted result,
but must instead be combined with all of the other predictors in thousands of different
ways before a final forecasted conclusion is reached. It is therefore the combination of vari-
ables, and not the variables in isolation, that produces the outputted risk level.29
First validation of HART
Any prediction model, regardless of the technology behind it, will be most accurate when
applied to the data that are used to construct it. Although random forests provide a means
of estimating a model’s accuracy based on its own construction data, it will – like all
models – lose a certain amount of this accuracy when applied against new data. For
this reason, within the force, an independent validation study30 was conducted of HART
during 2016, with data not used to build the model. Custody data for the full year of
2013 were used for the validation, using just under 15,000 custody events. The model’s
forecasts for each custody event during 2013 were then compared to the actual, known
outcomes over the following 24 months.
The 2013 validated accuracy overall of the model was 62.8%, which reflects a drop from
construction estimate of 68.5%. The largest loss of accuracy in validation occurred amongst
those that had actual high risk outcomes, where the accuracy rates fell from 72.6% to 52.7%
(i.e. of all those who actually displayed high risk behaviour, 52.7% were forecast to be high
risk in validation). The differing offender cohort during 2013 may have impacted upon this
reduction in high risk accuracy. The validation cohort featured a higher prevalence and fre-
quency of serious offending than the construction sample. Somemay consider this validated
accuracy level to be unacceptable. Alternatively, others may point to whether the level of
accuracy is better or worse than the clinical judgements made by individual custody officers,
statistics that historically have been completely unavailable, and which in Durham have yet
to be determined. Nevertheless, the validation results highlight the need to refresh and
rebuild these models as conditions change over time.
Although accuracy rates are easy to understand and quite appealing to a conventional
audience, the real power of machine learning approaches stems not from the avoidance of
errors, but in properly distributing the types of forecasting errors that do occur. The error
distribution in validation indicated an increase in cautious errors as opposed to dangerous
errors. While both types of errors increased in the validation cohort, over-estimates of risk
expanded further than under-estimates. Even more importantly, the rates of the most
dangerous form of error – forecasted as low risk, but actually high risk – remained
exactly the same in both cohorts, at 2.4% (i.e. of all those forecast low risk, only 2.4% actu-
ally displayed high risk behaviour). HART therefore becamemore cautious when presented
with a riskier cohort which contained an elevated proportion of actual high risk outcomes.
This increasing cautiousness was fully in line with the cost ratios built into the random
forest model, and successfully ensured that the least-desirable errors were minimised.
The cost ratios in the model mean that low risk forecasts are especially reliable, and are
correct more than three-quarters of the time. This low risk accuracy offers a great deal of
reassurance in providing decision support to custody officers. To achieve this accuracy on
29Barnes and Hyatt, n5.
30Sheena Urwin ‘Algorithmic Forecasting of Offender Dangerousness for Police Custody Officers: An Assessment of Accu-
racy for the Durham Constabulary Model’ (2017), Master’s Thesis, University of Cambridge.
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the lower end of the risk scale, however, HART must over-estimate risk in other areas,
which leads to the observed reductions in high risk accuracy.
Whilst the model becamemore cautious for the 2013 cohort, for some this raises ethical
questions over deliberately overestimating the risk of individual offenders, and the impact
that may have as organisational users of HART become aware that a sizable proportion of
high risk forecasts are intentionally inaccurate. For others, however, protecting the public
from the risk of high harm by minimising most dangerous errors is a priority, and the cost
ratio used in this model is ethically the appropriate route to take. The crucial point, for this
approach to forecasting, may be that this cost ratio is infinitely adjustable. The initial model
deployed in Durham used a ratio of approximately two cautious errors for each dangerous
error, but this value will almost certainly shift over time as these debates progress in
society. As Pasquale comments, ‘it’s important to maintain deontological patterns of jus-
tification in the technology world to complement the utilitarianism of cost-benefit
analysis.’31
The future of HART
HART is currently being refreshed with more recent data, and with an aim of removing one
of the two postcode predictors. It is anticipated at the date of writing that the model will
be live in late-2017, and that its use will expand beyond the current experimental Check-
point treatment programme, with the forecasts influencing all of the many other decisions
that are made in the wake of bringing a suspected offender into police custody.
The data used as predictors in HART will, for the time being, remain limited to those
held within Durham Constabulary systems. The system will not utilise data from other
local agencies in Durham, other police force areas, or national IT systems such as the
Police National Computer or the Police National Database. This limitation is just one
reason that such models can serve only to inform human decision making, and will
remain unable to function as the ultimate decision maker at any stage of the criminal
justice system. The model simply does not have all of the information available to it,
and can therefore only support human decision-makers, rather than replace them. The
custody officers will long retain their discretion and the model is not intended to fetter
the options available to them. With both their own local knowledge and their access to
other data systems, custody officers will frequently be aware of other information that
overrides the model’s predictions, and they must apply their own judgement in deciding
upon the disposition of each offender’s case.
Since the independent validation, Durham Constabulary has done further work to
better understand the ethical issues and support other police organisations who wish
to explore algorithms in policing, and this framework is explained in further detail
later. As a result of this work, the Constabulary has also undertaken awareness sessions
relating to unconscious bias, with further sessions planned aimed specifically at custody
police officers, utilising HART as a discussion topic. The purpose of these awareness ses-
sions is to ensure officers within the custody environment understand HART, and also
view HART as a decision support tool that cannot know all of the information available
31Frank A. Pasquale ‘Toward a Fourth Law of Robotics: Preserving Attribution, Responsibility, and Explainability in an Algo-
rithmic Society’ (July 14, 2017). Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 78, 2017; U of Maryland Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2017-21, 7. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3002546.
230 M. OSWALD ET AL.
to a human being. The custody officers, even with the introduction of algorithmic fore-
casting, remain the decision makers and must ensure that the HART output is but one
factor they consider alongside all of the many other factors they are statutorily obliged
to consider.
In a model of this nature, there is a clear need to understand how forecasts are produced.
Police leadership and legal authorities must also give serious consideration to the ethics
around using such models. It is the authors’ opinion that the intended purpose of the
model should firstly be fully understood. In the case of Durham Constabulary, the key
goal is to consistently identify offenders who present the proper risk level (Moderate Risk)
to qualify for Checkpoint, while minimising the potential for harm in our communities. Effec-
tive forecasting can lead to effective triage, which is crucial during a time when police
budgets continue to contract. Even more importantly, better triaging can lead to the right
offenders receiving the appropriate custody decision to support a desistance in committing
crime, referred to by Sherman as offender desistance policing.32
With decreasing resources and the costs associated with placing an offender into the
criminal justice system, it is important to ensure the most expensive and punitive
options are targeted on the right offenders. As Neyroud suggests, an evidence based
approach to the gateway of the justice system is critical to its effectiveness and is ‘urgently
necessary’.33 It is incumbent upon the police to fully explore all available options that
might more accurately and consistently target offenders, support their desistance from
offending, and to therefore minimise harm in communities by preventing future offend-
ing. Durham’s test of HART is a crucial first step to determining what place, if any, algorith-
mic forecasting techniques have in policing.
Critique
Societal perspective
As Burrell points out, it has long been the case that ‘large organizations (including private
sector firms and public institutions) have had internal procedures that were not fully
understood to those who were subject to them.’34 So what, it can be asked, is new
about algorithms? We attempt in this sub-section to review some of the major issues
faced by society from the rise of algorithms using HART as a case-study, and then in
the subsequent sub-section, to consider how the law might react to the issues at stake.
We touch upon ethical issues but do not attempt to explore these comprehensively,
instead using them to signpost issues and perspectives with which the law will interact.
Mittelstadt et al. pose a number of ethical concerns raised by algorithms including: (1)
inconclusive evidence leading to unjustified actions; (2) inscrutable evidence leading to
opacity; (3) misguided evidence leading to bias; (4) unfair outcomes leading to discrimi-
nation; and (5) transformative effects leading to challenges for autonomy and informa-
tional privacy.35 (We find much overlap between these areas of concern and the legal
32Lawrence W. Sherman and Peter W. Neyroud, Offender-Desistance Policing and the Sword of Damocles (Civitas, 2012).
33Peter W. Neyroud ‘Evidence-Based Triage in Prosecuting Arrestees Testing an Actuarial System of Selective Targeting’
(2015) International Criminal Justice Review.
34Burrell, n24 (2).
35Brent Daniel Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter and Luciano Floridi ‘The ethics of algorithms:
Mapping the debate’ Big Data & Society, July – December 2016, 1–21.
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issues discussed in the next section). The implementation of the HART model raises every
single one of these concerns to a greater or lesser extent.
Inconclusive evidence leading to unjustified actions
The conclusions drawn by the HART model are probable but not conclusive, recognised by
the advisory nature of the algorithm. The tool cannot possibly record and assess all factors
that affect the output, ‘and all these other factors that we neglect introduce uncertainty.’36
It does not assess family circumstances, the importance of a person’s job to their self-
esteem, the risk of flight or the risk for the victim or the offender themselves – nor
does it assess intelligence in anything other than the most simplistic manner, information
that is not easily categorised but yet can be crucial in building a picture of the real offen-
der. A human can, or might, do this however, or might just as easily use extra information
to conclude something that is not true. As Hildebrandt comments in relation to intelligent
machines, information does not ‘necessarily imply the attribution of meaning, as it may in
the case of humans.’37 Or to put it another way, ‘The numbers have no way of speaking for
themselves. We speak for them. We imbue them with meaning’ which might be ‘self-
serving.’38
Reflecting the above, Durham Constabulary concluded that the tool can only ever func-
tion as decision-support; it cannot be the arbiter of any decision.39 It remains to be seen,
however, how an algorithm might influence custody officer decision-making practices in
future. Might some (consciously or otherwise) prefer to abdicate responsibility for what are
risky decisions to the algorithm, resulting in deskilling and ‘judgmental atrophy’?40 Others
might resist the intervention of an artificial tool. Only future research will determine this. It
is therefore crucial that, as Hildebrandt argues, the human user is able to recognise ‘when
the automation goes awry, misrepresents relevant cases or misinterprets relevant causa-
tion’41 for instance that the human user is able to detect input errors leading to
misclassifications.
We might however fall into the trap of comparing algorithmic decisions with a mythical
perfect human decision-maker. Although human decision-making has always been
opaque to some extent, we are innately familiar with it,42 and so may be less troubled
by any opacity. Hildebrandt explains that meaning ‘depends on the curious entanglement
of self-reflection, rational discourse and emotional awareness that hinges on the opacity of
our dynamic and largely inaccessible unconscious.’43 Compared to human decision-
making, how much algorithmic error are we prepared to accept, or to put it another
way, what percentage accuracy will be required for an algorithmic tool to be deemed
fair: 60%, 80%, 100%? Should this be judged in relation to high risk errors, or all errors?
36Alpaydin, n1 (32).
37Mireille Hildebrandt ‘Law As Computation in the Era of Artificial Legal Intelligence. Speaking Law to the Power of Stat-
istics’ (June 7, 2017) 10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2983045.
38Nate Silver ‘The Signal and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction’ (Allen Lane, 2012).
39Durham Constabulary written evidence to Common Science &Technology Committee inquiry into algorithms in decision-
making, 26 April 2017 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/science-and-
technology-committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/inquiry9/publications/.
40Hildebrandt, n37 (14).
41Hildebrandt, n37 (15).
42Marion Oswald ‘Algorithmic tools – grasping reason’s full potential or ‘suppression of what we know’? Sherlock Holmes vs
Father Brown’ University of Winchester blog, 5 April 2017.
43Hildebrandt, n37 (10).
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How should we assess an algorithm if its accuracy, when compared against human judge-
ment, is variable i.e. sometimes the human makes better judgements, sometimes the
algorithm does?
A high accuracy rate will not be the end of the story, however, if the consequences of an
error for an individual are particularly serious. In the HART context, outcomes can only be
observed for released defendants, or those on the Checkpoint programme, not for those
who received a custodial sentence, thus creating a problem for validation by double-blind
methodology (although it should be noted that in the Durham area a large majority are
released from custody following arrest, especially compared to the US, so this enables a
significant number of offenders to be actually observed). In order to tackle this difficulty
in relation to bail decisions, Kleinberg et al. suggest a method of ranking judges as
strict or lenient and then inputing outcomes for jailed defendants using the outcomes
of offenders with similar observables who the more lenient judge released.44 Whether
this method would be feasible – or acceptable – in other law enforcement contexts is
questionable. Chouldechova and G’Sell argue for the need to compare the proposed
model to the existing approach across a range of task-relevant accuracy and fairness
metrics, and propose a framework for identifying sub-groups where the models differ in
terms of factors such as gender or race.45 These examples demonstrate that statistical
methods are available (and no doubt will continue to be developed) to assist in the assess-
ment of the accuracy of a selected model, both at a training stage and during application.
In Durham Constabulary, the initial version of HART has required the custody officers to
make their own predictions of each offender’s future arrests whenever the algorithm has
been used. These data will eventually allow a direct comparison of the police officer’s
human judgement to the HART forecasts. Early results show that custody officers are gen-
erally uneasy with forecasting at either extreme, and avoid making both high and low
risk predictions. A substantial majority of officer predictions are for moderate risk behaviour
(63.5%), and the model and officers agree only 56.2% of the time. There is a clear difference
of opinion between human and algorithmic forecasts. Nevertheless, caution should be taken
to not hold algorithms to an idealistic standard of accuracy that does not exist in reality.
Inscrutable evidence leading to opacity
With regards to opacity, while the input datasets may be comprehensible and the code
written clearly, ‘the interplay between the two in the mechanism of the algorithm is
what yields the complexity (and thus opacity).’46 Much has been done by Durham Consta-
bulary to raise awareness of its use of the tool, although it is recognised that, as the tool
moves on from its initial trial phase, further work may needed to produce a comprehen-
sible explanation of the relationship between the data inputs and the conclusion such that
it could be challenged by the individual affected or their legal adviser, or advice given
about what information to disclose in interview. Burrell highlights the challenges of impos-
ing ‘a process of human interpretative reasoning on a mathematical process of statistical
optimization’ querying whether this might result in ‘an understanding that is at best
44Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig and Sendhil Mullainathan ‘Human Decisions and
Machine Predictions’ NBER Working Paper Series, February 2017.
45Alexandra Chouldechova and Max G’Sell ‘Fairer and more accurate, but for whom?’ 30 June 2017. arXiv:1707.00046
[stat.AP].
46Burrell, n24 (5).
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incomplete and at worst false reassurance.’47 Our view is that the argument that ‘it’s a
black box and therefore inscrutable’ can no longer hold valid in relation to public sector
use of algorithms, if it ever was. A combination of approaches will be required to
combat opacity such as end-user facing components, independent audits, a context-
specific regulatory framework and the use of open source code.48
Even with these steps and the highest dedication to transparency, however, opacity
seems difficult to avoid. The HART model contains over 4.2 million decision points, all of
which are highly interdependent on the ones that precede them within the tree structure.
These details could be made freely available to the public, but would require a huge
amount of time and effort to fully understand. It is becoming increasingly difficult to
explain to non-computer scientists and non-statisticians how a machine learning forecast-
ing model arrives at its outcomes, and the potential for misunderstanding and even inten-
tional misrepresentation is vast.
Misguided evidence leading to bias
Mittelstadt et al. describe bias as ‘a dimension of the decision-making itself, whereas dis-
crimination describes the effects of a decision, in terms of adverse disproportionate impact
resulting from algorithmic decision-making.’49 It is a truism to say that, in the area of crim-
inal justice, a biased output that leads to a discriminatory effect could be seriously detri-
mental for the individuals involved. In the United States, concerns have been raised that a
proprietary algorithm called COMPAS used in bail decisions produced a result that was
biased against black defendants, despite race not being used as a predictor.50 O’Neil cri-
ticises ‘models that assume we’re birds of a feather and treat us as such. Innocent people
surrounded by criminals get treated badly, and criminals surrounded by a law-abiding
public get a pass.’51 (The human decision-maker may of course be similarly influenced
by such ‘birds of a feather’ view and algorithmically-informed decision-making can ‘help
government officials avoid the biases, explicit or implicit, that may creep into less
formal, “hunch”-based decision-making’52). Corbett-Davies et al. claim that much may
depend on the definition of fairness applied to COMPAS algorithm, but that if classification
errors disproportionality affect black defendants, there is an obligation to explore alterna-
tive policies.53 Kleinberg et al.’s research investigated competing notions of what it means
for a probabilistic classification to be fair to different groups, claiming that it is often
impossible to satisfy these conditions simultaneously.54
As discussed earlier, the HART model uses behavioural predictors, in combination with
age, gender and two forms of residential postcode, which could ‘be viewed as indirectly
47Burrell, n24 (9).
48Burrell, n24 (9–10).
49Mittelstadt et al., n35 (8).
50Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner ‘Machine Bias’ ProPublica, May 23, 2016 https://www.
propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.
51Cathy O’Neil ‘Weapons of Math Destruction’ (Allen Lane, 2016) 103–104.
52Robert Brauneis and Ellen P. Goodman ‘Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City’ (August 2, 2017). Yale Journal of Law
& Technology, Forthcoming; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper, 8. Available
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012499.
53Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller and Sharad Goel ‘A computer program used for bail and sentencing
decisions was labelled biased against blacks. It’s actually not that clear.’ The Washington Post, October 17, 2016.
54Jon Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan and Manish Raghavan ‘Inherent Trade-Offs in the Fair Determination of Risk Scores’
arXiv:1609.05807v2 [cs.LG] 17 Nov 2016 available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.05807.
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related to measures of community deprivation.’55 It makes predictions based on historical
offender data, and so will be affected by past arrest history, force targeting decisions, social
trends and prioritisation of certain offences (such as, recently, child sexual abuse offences,
domestic violence and hate crime). It has been argued that ‘it would be wrong, and the
error rates would increase, if the model failed to reflect reality’ i.e. the human judgements
that were made in the past.56 This statement would be hard to contradict if it were the case
that context never changed or if past data reflected a perfect reality. As it is, arrest and
charging decisions made by the police / Crown Prosecution Service even five years ago
may be taken very differently today.57 Carlo has argued ‘that data analysts should at
very least attempt to discover and control the biases in existing data sets before using
them to train AI tools or live deployment in the criminal justice system where they risk
being embedded and obscured from accountability.’58 A human decision-maker might
adapt immediately to a changing context (although unconscious bias may remain); the
same cannot necessarily be said to be true of an algorithmic tool, suggesting the need
for careful and constant scrutiny of the predictors used and frequently refreshing of the
algorithm with more recent historical data.
As we mentioned earlier, however, we must consider technology in use in its particular
context. The HART deployment is linked to a demonstrable policing objective: to assist the
identification of offenders who are eligible for the Checkpoint intervention, which in turn
aims to prevent future harm in communities by encouraging offenders away from a life of
crime. Due to the particular demographic of the force area, it is unlikely (although currently
untested) that the residential predictors could currently be a proxy for race (they could,
however, be a proxy for community depravation). Improving the safety of particular com-
munities is however one of the aims of the Checkpoint programme. It has been claimed
that ‘simply residing in a given post code has no direct impact on the result, but must
instead be combined with all of the other predictors in thousands of different ways
before a final forecasted conclusion is reached.’59 The context of the HART deployment
suggests that residence may be a relevant factor because of the aims of the intervention.
Only testing, including testing without address information being a factor, will tell whether
it should be a factor i.e. whether it is a relevant factor to the overall aims of the programme,
and whether removing it would result in an unacceptable decrease in accuracy.
Unfair outcomes leading to discrimination
Kraemer et al. comment that many algorithms ‘implicitly or explicitly comprise essential
value-judgments’60 and these also give rise to the potential for unfair outcomes. They
give an example of the design of an algorithm used in medical image technologies,
55n39.
56n39.
57Joh states, ‘Police are not simply end users of big data. They generate the information that big data programs rely upon
… . Their choices, priorities, and even omissions become the inputs algorithms use to forecast crime’ and therefore the
analysis may have ‘hidden limitations.’ Elizabeth E. Joh ‘Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, & Algorithms’ (August
16, 2017). __ William & Mary Bill of Rights J. __ (2017 Forthcoming), 3–4. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3020259.
58Silkie Carlo, Liberty quoted in ‘Artificial Intelligence, Big Data and the Rule of Law’ Event Report, The Bingham Centre for
the Rule of Law, 9 October 2017 https://www.biicl.org/event/1280.
59n39.
60Felicitas Kraemer, Kees van Overveld and Martin Peterson ‘Is there an ethics of algorithms?’ (2011) Ethics Inf Technol 13,
251–260, 251.
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where the software designer has to make a trade-off between minimising the number of
false positive results or the number of false negative results: ‘This trade-off will inevitably
be based on a value-judgment. There is simply no objective fact of the matter about
whether it is more desirable to avoid a false positive or a false negative… That said,
both false positives and false negative results may give rise to severe negative conse-
quences for individual patients.’61 Whereas a scientist may believe that it is more impor-
tant to avoid false positives than false negatives, a doctor may take the alternative view
based on a consequentialist approach: ‘if the algorithm is designed such that doctors
come to believe that patients who are actually diseased are not, then the doctors may
indirectly cause harm to patients by failing to treat them.’62 There is a risk however that
this approach might lead to unnecessary operations63 and therefore cost and risk of sur-
gical complications.
As Brauneis and Goodman point out, ‘The choice to privilege one type of error over
another is one of dozens or thousands of decisions that will inform the construction of
a predictive algorithm.’64 The HART model represents a real example of a value-judgement
built into an algorithm, so requiring a ‘trade-off’ to be made between false positives and
false negatives in order to avoid errors that are thought to be the most dangerous: in this
context, offenders who are predicted to be relatively safe, but then go on to commit a
serious violent offence (high risk false negatives). As a consequence, high risk false posi-
tives have been deliberately made more likely to result.65 Therefore, if HART was determi-
native, there could be a risk that an unacceptable number of low or medium risk
individuals might be classified as high risk. This may in practice be difficult to determine
in circumstances where outcomes can be observed only for a selection of individuals,
although this issue could be mitigated if regular validation studies are conducted. In
the context of recidivism prediction instruments, Chouldechova demonstrates that a
model ‘that satisfies predictive parity cannot have equal false positive and negative
rates across groups when the recidivism prevalence differs across those groups’; therefore,
Chouldechova concludes, different false positive and false negative rates between groups
can lead to disparate impact when individuals assessed as high risk receive stricter penal-
ties, suggesting the need for consideration of adjustment of predictors and error rates.66
Whether the overall benefit to society from a particular value-judgement built into an
algorithm justifies the possible negative consequences to single individuals may depend
to a large extent on the seriousness of those consequences. In the HART context, being
classified in error as high risk could mean missing the opportunity of being considered
for the Checkpoint programme, and so instead being subject to the normal court
process. Such consequences are arguably less dangerous for individuals than, say, a leng-
thier incarceration resulting from a false positive in a sentencing or bail context. The finan-
cial costs of these responses may also play a role. False positives may be more acceptable
when they result in only a very small expenditure, but far less appealing when a costly
response such as incarceration or intense psychotherapy is at stake. In addition, the
61Kraemer et al., n60 (255).
62Kraemer et al., n60 (257).
63Kraemer et al., n60 (257).
64Brauneis and Goodman, n52 (13).
65n39.
66Alexandra Chouldechova ‘Fair prediction with disparate impact: A study of bias in recidivism prediction instruments’ 28
February 2017 arXiv:1703.00056 [stat.AP]
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risks to individuals may be mitigated in the HART context by the advisory nature of the
model (provided that the prediction does not in reality have undue influence). Overall,
this debate illustrates that, as Kraemer at al. advise, it is essential that the designer
leaves it to the user to specify the parameters and value-judgments that should be built
into the algorithm.67
Transformative effects leading to challenges for autonomy and informational
privacy
We cannot yet say how the use of algorithmic tools within policing, and the HART model in
particular, will affect decision-making processes within police forces. It is clear that there
will be challenges however, both to the autonomy of the decision-maker and to the auton-
omy of the individual. No algorithm can hope to access every piece of information that
may be relevant to a law enforcement related decision; a human decision-maker must
retain discretion. Decision-support tools have the potential however to increase consist-
ency of decision-making by combining the outcome of the decisions of many officers
and using the same input criteria each time. It is also important to recognise that
human decision makers are also flawed in this regard. Pressed for time, they are equally
unlikely to access every piece of information at their disposal, and will almost certainly
use heuristic short-cuts in reaching their own decisions.
There remains a risk, however, that the imposition of an algorithm into a decision-
making process limits or filters the information that is considered in practice. In addition,
concerns around opacity raise challenges for an individual’s ability to understand, and
therefore to question or challenge, the process, as well as for the decision-maker’s
ability to justify and defend its process. Brauneis and Goodman highlight the risk that a
private vendor of algorithmic tools comes to own ‘critical data’ and so ‘occupies the
command center of urban governance while the democratically accountable officials
move to the periphery.’68 In terms of informational privacy, there is almost an inevitable
conflict between data science’s drive to make use of multifarious and partial sources of
digital data, and an individual’s informational identity: data can start ‘to drive the oper-
ation; it is not the programmers anymore but the data itself that defines what to do
next.’69 We explore the legal issues relating to autonomy and informational privacy in
greater length in the next section.
Legal perspective – judicial review and human rights principles
This section of our piece now gives an overview of case law that might be relevant to chal-
lenging or ‘stress-testing’ the use of algorithmic data analysis to give forecasting outcomes
in the criminal justice system; as with HART now operated by Durham Constabulary. This
section includes a consideration of whether necessity and proportionality principles, as
features of an eventual human rights law analysis, allow experimentation in new
methods of working for the police in this regard (i.e. where the benefits are not yet
clear cut). (Due to restrictions of length, we do not address data protection law, although
67Kraemer et al., n60 (258).
68Brauneis and Goodman, n52 (11) and ‘If the algorithm is opaque, the government official cannot know how to integrate
its reasoning with her own, and must either disregard it, or follow it blindly.’ (18).
69Alpaydin, n1 (11).
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we are aware of the application of these rules to sensitive classes of data that might be
included as inputs in an algorithmic tool, and indeed to circumstances where predicted
sensitive data may be generated by the tool.)
The USA – Loomis
Katherine Freeman has given a commanding overview of the case of State v Loomis in the
Wisconsin Supreme Court (an interesting case for us, given our subject matter, but one ulti-
mately rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States).70 Loomis had challenged his
sentencing upon conviction based upon the involvement of an algorithmic analysis (the
COMPAS software developed by Northpointe Plc.). Freeman draws our attention to the
‘technology effect’ of ‘automation bias’ – the tendency of people to trust computer-gener-
ated decisions; even and particularly here in the case of Loomis in relation to computerised
‘forecasting’ that on an individual human level has not been investigated or thought
through by a system operator/decision-maker. Yet the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected
the idea that the algorithmic assessment of an appropriate sentence for Loomis was uncon-
stitutional, even though the inner algorithmic workings and data weightings were not
revealed to the defendant due to commercial confidentiality. Loomis had argued that this
situation offended the ‘Due Process Clause’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the US Constitution, which stipulate that there shall be no interference with life, liberty
or property without due process of law. But the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the
COMPAS ‘forecast’ or assessment was not ‘determinative’ for the sentencing decision, and
that sufficient discretion resided in the role of the sentencing judge to maintain this
rather opaque assessment process as constitutional. The Wisconsin Supreme Court did
however identify a number of cautions in relation to the use of these tools including: the
proprietary nature of COMPAS preventing disclosure of information as to how risk scores
are determined; scores based on group data; and concerns regarding the disproportionate
classification of ethnic minority offenders as high risk. We explore these and other cautions
now in terms of the UK substantive grounds for judicial review.
The UK – substantive common law grounds for judicial review: the taking into
account of irrelevant considerations
As the famous case of Venables71 reminds us, decision-making by UK public bodies is
fraught with complexity around whether the correct relevant considerations have been
taken into account, and whether particular irrelevant considerations have been excluded
properly from the decision-making process. In Venables, the decision-making of a Home
Secretary over the length of sentence of imprisonment for the two notorious juvenile mur-
derers (Robert Thompson and the eponymous Jon Venables) of toddler Jamie Bulger was
deemed to be unlawfully flawed. This was due, in the view of the House of Lords, to a dis-
tinct influence from media pressure and the public condemnation over this outrageous
killing of such a young child, by children. This pressure had resulted in the unlawful
70See Michelle Liu ‘Supreme Court refuses to hear Wisconsin predictive crime assessment case’, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
26th June 2017, https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2017/06/26/supreme-court-refuses-hear-wisconsin-
predictive-crime-assessment-case/428240001/. See also Katherine Freeman ‘Algorithmic Injustice: How the Wisconsin
Supreme Court Failed to Protect Due Process Rights in State v. Loomis’ 18 N.C.J.L. & Tech. On. 75 (2016), http://ncjolt.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Freeman_Final.pdf.
71R v Home Secretary, ex p Venables [1998] AC 407.
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taking into account of a weight of public opinion and an unfair extension of the sentence
length for the two young killers.
A court, faced with a claim that an algorithm was constructed around the assessment of
even partly irrelevant information, as the claimant would see it, would need to consider if
the algorithm so constructed had resulted in a decision rendered unlawful by a failure to
take into account only relevant considerations, or the taking into account of irrelevant con-
siderations – as in Venables. Indeed, if the algorithmic tool itself was determined to be
‘unreliable science’ as Hamilton has called some predictive tools,72 then it is hard to see
how taking into account its output could be lawful.
Barnes and Hyatt argue (commenting on the building of a random forest model) that
‘since there is little penalty for including additional predictors – even when they add little
in the way of predictive power – a wide variety of different predictors can be used to con-
struct these models.’73 There must be considerable doubt however over the legality of the
use of certain pieces of older, known information about a person’s past. An example might
be the inclusion of spent convictions (that is, ‘spent’ under the provisions of the Rehabili-
tation of Offenders Act 1974) in an algorithmic assessment of risk by the police in a par-
ticular context. Under section 4 of that Act, a rehabilitated person shall be treated ‘for all
purposes in law’ as a person who has not committed the particular offence. An algorithm
could be designed to draw upon spent convictions as actuarial data about the risk a
person poses of (re)offending, but the decision to deny a person bail, for example,
based partly on an algorithmic assessment of a profile of a person including details of
their spent convictions, could be subject to a challenge by way of judicial review on the
grounds this was an ultra vires decision.74
In contrast, might we see in the future a decision that an algorithmic assessment is a
relevant consideration, particularly if linked to the resources of the public authority?75
The answer to this question will be highly context-dependent, although should the tech-
nology develop to such an extent that it is demonstrably ‘better’ than other assessment
methods (for instance in terms of accuracy when compared against the existing
method), it is not hard to envisage a situation where a public authority could justify an
algorithmic assessment as a ‘relevant consideration’, always subject to the points below
regarding discretion.
The fettering of discretion
Gal asks ‘to exercise positive freedom, must the user [which in the policing context, may
include the suspect] be aware of his self-inflicted limitations on choice, in particular the
technological limitations of the algorithm and the parameters used by it to make the
72Melissa Hamilton (2015) ‘Adventures in risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law’. Arizona State
University College of Law Arizona State Law Journal, 47 (1), pp. 1–62.
73Barnes and Hyatt, n5 (8).
74Such a decision, based on an algorithm or otherwise, if taking spent convictions into account, falls in the gap between the
two leading cases on how spent convictions can and cannot be used in decision-making by public bodies. In YA v London
Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham [2016] EWHC 1850, a local authority acted unlawfully in taking spent convictions
into account in refusing the claimant a place in social housing (since the decision related, the court must have felt, to a
‘legal purpose’) ; while in N v Governor of HMP Dartmoor [2001] EWHC Admin 93, a prison governor lawfully shared with
social services particular details of spent convictions of a prisoner re-entering the community on license, since public
protection is not a ‘legal purpose’ in the view of the court in that case, but a matter of public policy.
75R v Gloucestershire County Council ex parte Barry; R v Lancashire County Council ex parte Royal Association for Disability and
Rehabilitation [997] 2 All ER 1, 654 in which the resources of the authority were a relevant consideration.
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choice? Put differently, can a rational or authentic choice be made if one is not aware of
the factors that play into the decision made on his behalf?’76 These questions reflect one of
the fundamental UK public law issues that come into play when considering the operation
of algorithmic decision-making in the public sector: will a public authority be illegally fet-
tering its discretion if it relies upon an opaque algorithmic method? Is the decision-maker
actually being ‘hypernudged’ in only one direction?77 In the HART context, will, in reality,
custody officers ‘delegate responsibility to the algorithm’ because if they go against it ‘they
will undoubtedly face questions from higher up’?78
If an algorithm, used by police officers to shape their decision-making, in practice
became the producer of a decision unchallenged by a human user, de facto if not as a
matter of formal policy, then a claimant in judicial review might argue that they were
then subject to an unlawful decision; rendered illegal due to an inappropriate ‘fettering
of discretion’. This could also be the case if the individual claimant is presented with
the outcome of an algorithm-informed decision-making process, with then no opportunity
to contest that decision. Similar claims could also result if human overrides of the algor-
ithm occur mostly in only one direction, such as increasing the perceived level of risk.
These sketched scenarios would be hypothetical breaches of the principle that a
decision-making pubic body in the UK must listen to ‘someone with something new to
say’. Famously, Lord Reid in British Oxygen said that:
There may be cases where an officer or authority ought to listen to a substantial argument
reasonably presented urging a change of policy. What the authority must not do is to
refuse to listen at all. But a Ministry or large authority may have had to deal already with a
multitude of similar applications and then they will almost certainly have evolved a policy
so precise that it could well be called a rule. There can be no objection to that provided
the authority is always willing to listen to anyone with something new to say – of course I
do not mean to say that there need be an oral hearing.79
We should keep in mind that algorithmic risk scores are intended to predict the likelihood
that those with a similar history are likely to behave in a similar way. They do not assess the
individual human. Public law issues may arise if the use of an algorithmic tool comes to
mean in practice that factors such a person’s family circumstances and their job are not
considered where clearly relevant to the decision in question. Depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the algorithmic decision-making under discussion, however, an ‘oral
hearing’ (perhaps simply, in one context, an interview at a sergeant’s desk in a police
station custody suite) might be very appropriate, if this was also a way to ensure the
natural justice rights of an individual subject of such a decision.
Rights in natural justice – procedural common law grounds for judicial review
Although much human reasoning may be subconscious and thus opaque to some extent,
machine learning introduces a different type of opacity: ‘the neural network doesn’t, for
example, break down handwritten digit recognition into subtasks that are readily
76Gal, n2 (25).
77Karen Yeung, ‘‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’ (2017) Information, Communication & Society
20(1) 118–136.
78Richard Atkinson quoted in Mark Bridge and Gabriella Swerling ‘Bail or jail? App helps police make decision about
suspect’ The Times, May 11, 2017, 19.
79British Oxygen Co Ltd v Minister of Technology [1971] AC 610, 625.
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intelligible to humans.’80 We agree with Edwards and Veale that – at least in relation to the
private sector’s use of algorithms – ‘the search for a right to an explanation [of algorithmic
workings] may be at best distracting and at worst nurture a new kind of “transparency
fallacy” to match the existing phenomenon of “meaningless consent.”’81 The rules of
natural justice and the duty to give reasons, however, mean that public bodies with sig-
nificant power over the lives of individuals must take steps to foster meaningful transpar-
ency, in ways that would allow a defendant to challenge the operation of the tool. As
Pasquale says, ‘Explainability matters because the process of reason-giving is intrinsic to
juridical determinations – not simply one modular characteristic jettisoned as anachronis-
tic once automated prediction is sufficiently advanced.’82
Lord Hodson in Ridge v Baldwin83 said that: ‘No one, I think, disputes that three features
of natural justice stand out – (1) the right to be heard by an unbiased tribunal, (2) the right
to have notice of charges of misconduct, (3) the right to be heard in answer to those
charges.’ It could be said that a risk-averse algorithm, which we know over-estimates
risk in order to maximise public protection but which generates a degree of ‘false positives’
of high-risk results to do this, might actually be creating a biased process (or tribunal of
sorts), in breach of the first feature of natural justice as Lord Hodson has it, above.
In relation to what is known as the duty to give reasons, we can also see that the
common law might require that the algorithm used to make decisions that interfere
with the rights of a subject be explicable, and in fact be explained to the person con-
cerned. In short, to what extent should the police be required to show how an algorithm’s
‘mind is working’ per Lord Mustill in Doody?84 A system of challenge and complaint to an
independent body must after all start somewhere, and the provision of information about
the basic workings of an algorithm allows for the process of transparency to begin. In this
way, the duty to give reasons might well tie things together for algo-justice, ensuring that,
with an appropriate system of complaint and challenge in place, interim ‘experimental’
proportionality (as described below) can be used as a judicial and public policy tool to
allow the police to adopt new algo-strategies and techniques. We accept though that
the complexity of algorithmic tools may mean that information (of itself) may not genu-
inely overcome opacity.85 Comprehensive oversight by an independent, expert body is
likely also to be needed to provide the appropriate reassurance.
The ECHR – article 8 and the right to respect for private life
We must pose the question of whether Article 8 ECHR is even engaged by the algorithmic
assessment of risk in a policing setting using data readily available on individuals to police
bodies. JR3886 was a case that saw the UK Supreme Court develop an overt ‘reasonable
80Burrell, n24 (6).
81Edwards and Veale, n22 (60).
82Pasquale, n31 (9).
83Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, 132.
84R v SSHD ex parte Doody [1993] UKHL 8.
85Recognising the limitations of explanations of algorithmic workings, in relation to the General Data Protection Regulation,
Wachter et al. propose instead ‘counterfactual explanations’ which would describe the smallest change that can be made
to achieve a desirable outcome. Adopting such an approach in the Checkpoint or other criminal justice contexts however
could present a number of challenges: Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt and Chris Russell ‘Counterfactual Explanations
Without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR’ (October 6, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3063289.
86In the matter of an application by JR38 for judicial review [2015] UKSC 15.
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expectation of privacy’ test to judge whether or not Article 8 ECHR, and the right to respect
for private life, is even engaged by the police use of personal information and intelligence.
A judgment according to this test is of course heavily context-dependent. Assuming that
the courts would readily agree that algorithmic risk assessment does engage Article 8
ECHR, this qualified right under the Convention does then lay down a series of criteria
which are best seen through the lens of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. In MM the ECtHR noted that:
The requirement that any interference must be ‘in accordance with the law’ under Article 8.2
means that the impugned measure must have some basis in domestic law and be compatible
with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention and
inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8. The law must thus be adequately accessible
and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual – if
need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct. For domestic law to meet these
requirements, it must afford adequate legal protection against arbitrariness and accordingly
indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion conferred on the competent authorities
and the manner of its exercise… 87
And so we return, in essence, to the issue that the use of algorithmic tools must be
transparent, and show to some appropriate degree their inner workings, and allow
for challenge and complaint. The statutory regulation of police algorithmic analysis
tools would likely be the surest way to ensure that ‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’, suf-
ﬁcient to satisfy the ECtHR, would be achieved, as the police use of this technology
grows in time.
‘Experimental’ proportionality and the ‘ALGO-CARE’ framework
Burrell has argued that a combination of approaches will be required to combat the con-
sequences of algorithmic opacity, including context-specific regulatory frameworks.88 This
section sets out two linked proposals reflecting such an approach: a concept of ‘exper-
imental’ proportionality and a decision-making guidance framework for the deployment
of algorithmic assessment tools in the policing context called ‘ALGO-CARE’.
‘Experimental’ proportionality
An issue for the courts in reviewing the use of a particular algorithm by the police is highly
likely to be that some algorithmic tools are so new that the resource benefits have yet to
be realised, and it may be too early to judge the benefits and harms with ease. This would
create difficulties in the final assessment of the proportionality of the use of the algorithm,
that is to say, whether or not the tool is ‘necessary’ i.e. the least intrusive, and whether the
use of the algorithm results in a ‘fair balance’ between the rights of an individual and the
benefits for wider society (perhaps cost savings for the police along with more consistent
decision-making by police officers), and thus whether algorithmic tools help to achieve a
‘better’ outcome than other methods.
Despite the above, we would not go so far as Fontanelli in dismissing proportionality as
a ‘mythology’ and a ‘formulaic incrustation’ that should be replaced by ‘policy-oriented
87MM v UK [2012] ECHR 1906, para 193.
88Burrell, n24 (9–10).
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pragmatism’89 although we agree that the use of algorithmic technologies in the public
sector requires ‘reformative law making’ and an open acknowledgement of the relevance
of pragmatic or policy-based arguments.90 We support Rivers’ description of the propor-
tionality test as ‘an intuitive requirement of reason’91 and his argument that, in order
that the test is not weakened, certain circumstances which give rise to a ‘presumption
of proportionality’ should be recognised, where the ‘benefit of the doubt’ is given to
the public authority.92 Such circumstances, Rivers argues, could include decisions made
under approved, proportionate, sets of rules and procedurally-rigorous judgements of pro-
portionality by well-qualified public bodies.93
Turning to recent case-law, we might predict that the UK Supreme Court is likely to take
the view that, provided the interference is not substantial, and the rational connection
with a legitimate aim is demonstrated, the use of data by an algorithm would be propor-
tionate if such use is kept under a system of challenge and review that is accessible by
individuals, as in the case of Catt.94 A crucial assessment would be whether, for those indi-
viduals subject to an action or decision, they were made aware of the way that an algor-
ithm was used to present them as a ‘risk’ or a ‘candidate’ for an intervention that interfered
with their rights. This broad notification principle would allow for means of that individual
(albeit perhaps not very fruitfully) objecting to the use of the personal data in the algor-
ithm concerned, to the way that the algorithm processed the data and/or to the overall
assessment made by the tool. After all, Lord Sumption in Catt did write of his confidence
in the relevant internal police review mechanisms, and the process of making complaints
to the Information Commissioner, that John Catt could have pursued as an alternative to
taking (ultimately unsuccessfully) to the courts to challenge the proportionality of the
retention of police intelligence on his peaceful actions at public protests. As such, a
system of regulation, review and objection/complaint over the use of algorithms in the
criminal justice setting might be all that is needed to allow considerable innovations in
the field of ‘algorithmic policing’.
We propose a more formalised approach, however, which would have the dual advan-
tages of permitting the use of unproven algorithms in the public sector in order that
benefits and harms can be fully explored, yet giving the public confidence that such
use would be controlled and time-limited and the proportionality subject to a further
review on a stipulated future date (so a similar aim to a ‘sunset’ clause in legislation95).
This concept would encapsulate two elements. First, a formal adoption of the implicit
approach to the doctrine of proportionality itself taken by the court in Catt (to allow
the ‘benefit of the doubt’ to be given to the public sector body where it is not yet possible
to determine with any certainty the balance or imbalance of benefits and disadvantages in
relation to the new algorithmic technology). Secondly, a change to statutory procedure
and forms of relief available so that the High Court could order that the benefits and
89Filippo Fontanelli ‘The Mythology of Proportionality in Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union of Inter-
net and Fundamental Rights’ Oxford J Legal Studies (2016) 36(3) 630–660, 658.
90Fontanelli, n89 (631).
91Rivers, n 20 (413).
92Rivers, n 20 (412).
93Rivers, n 20 (430).
94R (on the application of Catt) (Respondent) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and another (Appellants) [2015] UKSC
9.
95http://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/sunset-clause/.
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harm risks, and so the proportionality of the particular use of the algorithm, be reviewed in
another hearing after a period of time. This ‘experimental’ proportionality approach is one
that a regulator could take when assessing these new technologies, and also could inform
the methods of internal assessments by public bodies when considering the adoption of
algorithmic technologies including the adoption of specified trial and review periods after
which, should proportionality not be demonstrated, further use of the technology would
not be authorised.
‘Experimental’ proportionality as laid out above is not however intended to permit a
‘free-for-all’ situation in which algorithmic tools could be deployed in the public sector
without restriction. The police force, or other public sector body, would still be required
to comply with the requirements of natural justice as set out above, even in the ‘exper-
imental’ stage. In addition, the public sector body must still demonstrate a baseline con-
nection to a legitimate aim and that the outcomes and benefits (even if these are as yet
theoretical or only foreseen) are rationally connected to that aim and, based on the knowl-
edge available, a reasonable belief that there is not an excessive cost to human rights. The
public body would then, in effect, benefit from a limited ‘presumption of proportionality’
(as argued for by Rivers) for a limited period of time, based on its procedural duty ‘to
approach the question of necessity as part of its own internal decision-taking process
with a certain rigour.’96 We appreciate though that many may balk at such a presumption
of rigour, particularly in relation to the use of algorithmic technologies in the policing
context where consequences for individuals are potentially serious. Our second proposal
is therefore designed to contribute to such decision-making rigour, a decision-making fra-
mework called ‘Algo-care’.
‘ALGO-CARE’
The framework – ‘Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE™’ – reflects the experience of
Durham Constabulary in developing and rolling out its algorithm associated with the
Checkpoint programme. It also aims to translate key public law and human rights prin-
ciples into practical considerations and guidance that can be addressed by public
sector bodies. The authors note that a number of organisations are developing, or advo-
cate developing, high level principles in respect of data governance, algorithms and A.I.97
(which can be helpful to represent ethical norms and in building governance standards). In
order to provide practical certainty, such principles must result in the development of
administrative and assessment frameworks for practitioners to refer to in their day-to-
day work. Algo-care aims to address this requirement for the use of predictive tools in
the policing context, guidance which could be used in parallel with privacy and equality
impact assessments (and which could provide a way of implementing Pasquale’s call for
‘responsibility-by-design’).98
The current working version of ‘Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE™’ is set out in
Figure 1 below, together with additional explanatory notes (Figure 2). Each word in the
mnemonic – Advisory; Lawful; Granularity; Ownership; Challengeable; Accuracy; Responsible;
96Rivers, n 20 (430).
97Such as ‘Data management and use: Governance in the 21st century’ A joint report by the British Academy and Royal
Society, June 2017, 7.
98Pasquale, n31 (11).
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Figure 1. Algorithms in Policing – Take ALGO-CARE™.
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Explainable – is supplemented in Figure 2 by questions and considerations representing
key legal considerations (such as necessity and proportionality, natural justice and pro-
cedural fairness as discussed above), as well as prosaic but crucial practical concerns
such as intellectual property ownership and the availability of an ‘expert witness’ to the
tool’s functionality, which link to a force’s ability to comply with its obligations of pro-
cedural fairness. The specification for an assessment tool, whether built by academia,
the private sector or the public sector itself, must reflect its link to the public sector’s ulti-
mate objective; as Kraemer comments, problems will arise if the background assumptions
of the designer are not in accordance with the user.99
Figure 1. Continued.
99Kraemer et al., n60 (258).
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Figure 2. Brief explanatory notes and additional considerations.
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Figure 2. Continued.
Note: aAt the time of writing, New York City Council had proposed a local law to require public agencies that use algorithms
to publish the source code used for such processing. http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=
3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E1-47E2-9C42-461253F9C6D0.
bWe note the obstacles highlighted by Brauneis and Goodman, including assertions of trade secrets, in relation to the use of
US freedom of information laws to obtain information about government use of algorithmic decision-making tools, n52. In
the UK, consideration could be given to expanding the sector specific model publication schemes for public authorities
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 s20 to include appropriate information about the use of algorithmic
decision-making tools in order to encourage such information to be provided publicly and proactively (and thus to set
expectations for third party providers).
chttps://www.durham.police.uk/About-Us/Transparency-and-Integrity-Programme/Pages/1-Oversight-and-Accountability.
aspx.
dhttps://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/national-statistician/national-statisticians-data-ethics-advisory-committee/.
eIt is beyond the scope of this article to comment upon the scope and efficacy of the different methods proposed. The
following represents a selection: Adler et al. ‘Auditing Black-box Models for Indirect Influence’ arXiv:1602.07043v2
[stat.ML] 30 Nov 2016; Will Knight ‘The U.S. Military Wants Its Autonomous Machines to Explain Themselves’ MIT Technol-
ogy Review, March 14, 2017; Kroll et al. ‘Accountable Algorithms’ (2017) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165, 633-
705; also see Edwards and Veale, n22, for an overview of different methods.
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We appreciate that this framework does not provide any firm answers, nor do we
claim to have covered every issue that may be relevant to the deployment of an algo-
rithmic tool within policing or the wider public sector. In taking the first cautious steps
into the use of algorithmic tools, Durham Constabulary is essentially engaging in
experimental research, with the resultant requirement for ongoing testing and vali-
dation that such research entails. A police force, however, has an overarching public
function to fulfil, and a decision to take as to whether, and if so when, to deploy a
new technology for the purposes of the prevention and detection of crime. It
seems inevitable that the deployment of an experimental algorithmic tool will
always come with uncertainties as to its efficacy and proportionality. Careful consider-
ation of the factors set out in Algo-care should assist in reducing those uncertainties.
This cannot be a once-and-for-all assessment however, as future impact is often uncer-
tain, thus supporting our parallel proposal for new procedures to keep the proportion-
ality of these technologies under review.
Conclusion
From the beginning of the development of this tool, and since its validation, Durham Con-
stabulary has been open about its use of this algorithm, attracting considerable attention.
The purpose of being so open was to acknowledge that this approach is new to policing
and is therefore also new to communities. Secondly, being open permits learning and
understanding from others in relation to concerns and issues that exist. Thirdly and
lastly, capturing that learning throughout the exploratory process has allowed the Consta-
bulary to place these lessons into a framework to support and assist other police organis-
ations – ‘Algo-care’. The ‘Algo-care’ framework provides a roadmap at the start of a project
which is a more comfortable place to start from. There must however be acknowledge-
ment that the first time anything is tried it can, by definition, only ever be exploratory
in nature, which is why Durham Constabulary have anchored the use of this model
within an evidence based framework with academic rigour to effectively test ‘What
Works’ in policing, and to test one possible response to HART’s forecasts.
In relation to all uses of algorithmic decision-making technology, the aim must be to
‘augment human legal [and other] intelligence, not to replace it’100 and to ensure that arti-
ficial intelligence ‘aligns with law and the Rule of Law in a testable and contestable way.’101
We have attempted with our ideas around ‘experimental’ proportionality and ‘Algo-care’
to provide structures that support these aims, yet do not hold back the responsible devel-
opment of algorithmic tools that might provide new and potentially ‘better’ solutions for
criminal justice problems, particularly those which currently involve clouded, non-aug-
mented decision-making or risk assessment where human decisions may be subject to
opaque heuristic shortcuts and potential biases. True utility can only be understood if
we allow innovation with real data. But innovation implies a degree of uncertainty
about the outcome. For policing to benefit from algorithmic innovation, and data
science more broadly, we need a mechanism that facilitates controlled experimentation.
‘Experimental’ proportionality, combined with a rigorous decision-making framework,
100Hildebrandt, n37 (15).
101Hildebrandt, n37 (16).
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provides a model that recognises this reality while at the same time acknowledging the
risks to individual rights.
Finally, we ask ourselves whether we risk missing anything if policing becomes under-
stood only as data-processing and decision-making.102 Implicit in the points made in the
‘Lawful’ section of ‘Algo-care’ above is whether a statistical, algorithmic method is appro-
priate at all in each given situation, and whether it can ever be justified to use certain cat-
egories of data, for instance ethic origin, as ‘inputs’. We would advocate that, as part of a
programme of legal reform, clarity is needed as to categories of decision – such as those
that may impact Article 2 rights or the fundamentals of a fair trial – that would not benefit
from ‘experimental’ or presumptions of proportionality and indeed which should be
excluded from the purview of algorithmic tools altogether.
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